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Introduction to “New Governance and 
the Business Organization” 
Special Issue of Law and Policy 
 
CRISTIE FORD and MARY CONDON 
 
 
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
The point of departure for this exciting collection of articles is to advance the 
scholarly treatment of “new governance” by shifting its focus away from 
what regulators do or how they do it, and towards examining the encounter 
between new governance and business organizations, within those 
organizations themselves.1 As is evident from this issue, this shift still 
provides a broad canvas on which to work, as the types of business 
activity examined here through the lens of new governance encompass 
railways, food safety, corporate privacy, and bank lending, as well as 
securities and derivatives trading. A particular strength of the articles in this 
issue is the presentation of original empirical research, ranging from 
surveys of business in the UK food sector (Hutter) and a case study of 
corporate restructuring (Sarra) to interviews with privacy officers 
  
(Bamberger and Mulligan), bankers (Conley and Williams), and corporate 
monitors (Ford and Hess). While most of the papers focus on specific 
domestic contexts for business activity, Conley and Williams’ paper is 
pitched at the global take up of the Equator Principles for project 
lending, and Ford and Hess comment on comparisons between Canada 
and the United States in the implementation of corporate monitorship 
programmes. 
The editors of this issue are committed to the idea that the analysis of new 
governance needs to move beyond theory into practice and implementation. 
Accordingly, we do not engage in an exhaustive description of the contours 
of the phenomenon in this introduction. We also do not engage with the 
distinctions between discrete versions of new governance or between new 
governance and related regulatory approaches. Much of this mapping has 
been ably undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g., Gilad 2010; Wisconsin Law Review 
2010; de Búrca and Scott 2006, 2007). What is relevant for our purposes is the 
broad agreement in the literature around several elements central to new 
governance. The first is a restructured and more collaborative relationship 
between the state and regulated entities, based on the recognition that 
regulation may operate most effectively when it incorporates private 
actors’ context-specific experience and relevant expertise (Freeman 1997; 
Grabosky 1995), as well as potentially the experience and expertise of 
other nonstate actors (Parker 2002). This may extend to public recognition 
and enforceability of “rules” developed by nonstate actors (Meidinger 
2006; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Second, new governance imagines 
giving regulated entities greater autonomy to design their own internal 
  
processes to meet broadly defined outcomes (Lobel 2004; Coglianese and 
Lazer 2003). This freedom is counterbalanced by mechanisms designed to 
force transparency and accountability. Specifically, the articles in this issue 
connect to new governance from the particular vantage point of business 
organizations’ compliance functions, internal governance mechanisms, 
and/or self-regulation. New governance has special relevance to such 
functions because it envisions a dynamic and endogenously developed 
understanding of governance and compliance (Ford 2008). The focus on 
developing regulatory strategies that place responsibility on organizations 
for their own compliance, and that try to foster or engage with authentic 
compliance-supporting internal motivations, is of central importance to the 
current project. 
Third, the theoretical new governance approach emphasizes problem-
solving and experimentation in the ongoing design of regulatory strategies 
(Sabel and Simon 2004; Sparrow 2000). Moreover, because of our 
preoccupation with implementation, this issue has a particular affinity 
with the most explicitly pragmatic, learning-by-doing versions of new 
governance, notably experimentalism (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Finally, some 
new governance and related scholarship incorporates broader 
emancipatory, democratic, or neo-republican concerns (Shearing and Wood 
2003; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). While that more 
ambitious agenda is not fully engaged here, broad stakeholder 
participation and “voice” is a fourth theoretical underpinning, essential 
to both legitimacy and effectiveness, and it is touched on in some form 
by all of the authors in this issue. 
  
The authors each take as his or her point of departure a specific set of 
features of new governance in which they ground their specific analyses. For 
example, while Hutter emphasizes the decentralization of regulation and 
changing notions of the degree to which the regulated are held responsible for 
developing internal governance processes, both Bamberger and Mulligan, as 
well as Ford and Hess, foreground the revisability and experimentation 
aspects of new governance thinking. It is possible therefore that, as some 
argue, the definition of new governance itself is constituted and reconstituted 
during evolving interactions among organizations around specific 
governance mechanisms (Huising and Silbey 2009). 
Another reason for the focus in this issue on understanding the 
implementation of new governance ideas is that the global financial 
crisis of 2007–2009 arguably exposed some shortcomings both in 
regulatory capacity and in financial firms’ willingness to self-monitor 
towards the end of systemic stability. The articles presented in this 
issue provide a vantage point for a more nuanced assessment of the 
possibilities and limits of new governance going forward. We note the 
interesting diversity of views, ranging from scepticism to cautious 
optimism, ultimately expressed in these articles concerning the continued 
salience of new governance approaches after the crisis. The articles 
presented here individually contain rich seams of analysis bearing on the 
question of the extent to which, and how, new governance becomes 
embedded in a variety of organizational locations. However, a number of 
cross-cutting themes may also be identified. 
 
  
 
I. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF NEW 
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES 
 
In its own way, each article recognizes that background conditions impact 
the way in which new governance processes get implemented, which may 
point towards the ultimate success or failure of such initiatives. Some 
iterations of the new governance literature derive from the idea of 
“regulatory capitalism,” that is, the proposition that regulation has 
adopted a middle road between pure state service provision and extensive 
deregulation, pushing the state to adopt a facilitative and cooperative 
stance towards business in regulating its activities (Levi-Faur 2005, 
2009). In an article originally presented at the conference that sparked 
this special issue, Christine Parker (2009) argued that new governance 
style “enforceable undertakings,” or corporate monitorships, are a logical 
consequence of regulatory capitalism’s need to navigate around the 
“traps” of potentially ill-fitting compliance strategies and potentially ill-
fitting deterrence ones. Meanwhile, Hutter identifies a shift away from a 
controlling and towards a “constitutive” conception of regulatory action 
with respect to business activity (Shearing 1993). She also pays attention to 
the specifics of industry structure (how many sophisticated organizations, 
how many small actors) as relevant conditions for the uptake of new 
governance initiatives. Ford and Hess tease out the notion of 
“organizational culture” (including fears of liability and patterns of 
expertise-based homogeneity) as both a motivation for the creation of 
  
corporate monitorships in the first place and, ultimately, an obstacle to their 
success (as Ford and Hess define success). Finally, Conley and Williams 
acknowledge that the difficulties of imposing command-and-control–type 
regulation on multinational companies are part of the landscape in which 
the Equator Principles have flourished. 
 
II. RISK MANAGEMENT AS NEW GOVERNANCE 
 
In a number of these articles, risk management emerges as an overarching 
form of new governance, involving as it does a shift away from a 
preoccupation with compliance with external legal norms and towards an 
enterprise of containing and managing risks to an organization emanating 
from a variety of sources (including, of course, the risk of various legal 
liabilities). Condon has noted that the scholarship on risk regulation and 
that on new governance has tended not to extensively converge; the articles 
in this issue are emerging examples of that valuable cross-pollination 
(Condon 2007). Accordingly, Hutter’s article most explicitly recognizes 
both risk regulation and the risk management responses of organizations as 
forms of new governance, while her empirical research demonstrates the 
difficulties of actually implementing risk management strategies throughout 
even sophisticated organizations. Bamberger and Mulligan frame their 
discussion of emerging corporate practices around privacy in terms of the 
increasingly pervasive understanding of privacy “as a risk to be managed 
rather than a matter of legal compliance.” In contrast to Hutter, their 
research points to an optimistic outcome whereby the “integration of 
  
privacy into existing decision making structures . . . promotes privacy’s 
consideration as a systemic risk, consistent practices across firm units, 
and the commitment of employees from across the firm” (p. 504). 
Meanwhile, Conley and Williams are cautiously optimistic about the 
progressive role to be played by the market-based Equator Principles as a 
form of quasi-regulation, in large part because adherence to these principles 
allows lending banks to manage their own financial risks. Finally, Sarra 
considers the increasing use of equity derivatives by financial market 
participants, in terms of the implications of that trading strategy for 
traditional understandings of the rationale for shareholder “voice” in 
corporate decision-making. To the extent that entering into derivatives 
transactions is an exercise in risk management for those shareholders, 
Sarra’s article suggests that shareholders are increasingly signalling that 
derivatives transactions are a more effective market-based strategy for 
risk management than the capacity to exercise “voice” in corporate 
decision making. More generally, however, an increasing focus on risk 
management as a strategy of governance in business organizations raises 
difficult issues about who will ultimately be able to participate in 
governance processes, since risk management has been conceived in the 
academic literature as a process that privileges technocratic and “expert” 
knowledge (Power 2007; Beck 1992). 
 
 
 
  
III. AGENCY, VOICE, AND EXPERTISE IN NEW GOVERNANCE 
 
The articles in this issue deal with a cluster of issues revolving around where 
agency for new governance initiatives is or is not located in organizational 
contexts. A related issue, mentioned above, is charting the significance of 
particular bodies of “expertise” in implementing or shaping such initiatives. 
Hutter’s article contains a valuable assessment of different stakeholders’ 
relative agency within the food safety sector. Interestingly, her research on 
that sector in the UK domestic context did not accord much agency to 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as an influence on business 
practices. This is in contrast to Conley and Williams’ article, which accords 
high significance to the role of environmental NGOs as a factor in pushing 
financial institutions to adopt the Equator Principles into their lending 
practices. Ford and Hess describe the corporate monitorship process as one 
in which the corporate entity seeks to retain as much agency as possible over 
the scope of the work conducted by the monitors, though their dissatisfied 
view of the outcomes to date is ultimately connected to the lack of 
enthusiasm they find among ex-prosecutor corporate monitors to achieve 
expansive goals. 
Meanwhile, Sarra’s article spans several different locations for addressing 
questions of agency in new governance: her case study of the Algoma Steel 
corporate restructuring and her analysis of the role of equity derivatives in 
corporate governance. With respect to the former, she finds the capacity of 
the corporation’s employees to exercise agency in that restructuring to be 
partial and contingent. With respect to the latter, she ultimately locates 
  
agency for corporate governance outcomes in the market innovation of 
equity derivatives themselves. Finally, while Bamberger and Mulligan focus 
primarily on internal actors (privacy officers) as agents of change in the 
privacy context, they also see a significant role for the “activist regulator” in 
promoting the responsibilization of these internal change agents. 
A recurring theme is scepticism about the possibilities for broad citizen 
involvement in new governance processes, even while the importance of 
striving towards this goal is reinforced. While Hutter’s article references the 
importance accorded to consumers as an influence on the activities of food 
managers, Conley and Williams find that “[A]t almost every turn in 
corporate social responsibility practice, including the EPs project, 
someone else speaks for the local communities that are its presumed 
beneficiaries” (p. 568). As noted above, Sarra’s findings with respect to the 
role of employees in the Algoma Steel restructuring were that that influence 
was highly contingent on a temporary and politically supported possession 
of economic leverage. Finally, responding to their concerns about the 
expertise-based and insular world of enforced corporate monitorships, Ford 
and Hess examine the possibilities for achieving increased public 
participation in the monitorship regime. 
In implementing new governance processes, the significance to be accorded 
to specific bodies of “expertise” is highly contextual and situation dependent. 
Here again we see several different stories. For Hutter, there is a lesson from 
her research on the railway industry related to the difficulty of implementing 
effective strategies for dealing with occupational health and safety problems 
throughout the organization. She notes, in characterizing the experience of 
  
 
British Rail (BR) with self-regulation around these requirements as “more 
procedural than substantive,” that “BR was a complex organization 
comprising a diversity of professions, encompassing a variety of businesses 
. . . This led potentially to a great source of variation” (p. 468). Meanwhile, 
Bamberger and Mulligan point to the development of a new profession of 
“chief privacy officer,” as well as the integration of a “network of specially 
trained employees into business lines as a means of identifying and 
addressing privacy concerns,” as critical to successfully governing 
privacy in the business organizations studied (p. 488). Conley and 
Williams also point to the emerging role of consulting firms used to 
prepare environmental and social impact assessments for those seeking 
loans from global banks. 
Ford and Hess reflect on the poor fit between the professional expertise 
of the ex-prosecutors who typically become corporate monitors, and the 
expansive role intended for those monitors, especially with respect to the 
ongoing development of learning about best practices that may be gleaned 
from specific examples of implementation. On the other hand, Ford and 
Hess remain cautious about whether a complete solution to this problem 
would lie in the development of a profession of “corporate monitor” with 
more organizational compliance expertise, because of the potential for 
insularity, homogeneity, and lack of public accountability that may result. 
 
 
 
  
IV. MOTIVATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
A number of the articles speak to whether it is possible to identify factors 
that motivate organizations to embed new governance processes internally. 
There is some convergence evident in the Conley and Williams, Bamberger 
and Mulligan, and Hutter articles, as they all reference external pressures, 
whether from consumers, the public, or the idea of “reputational risk.” 
Conley and Willams and Sarra also reference economic self-interest as a 
driver of participation in new governance initiatives. This point bears further 
examination, however, because one of the key insights of Sarra’s article is 
indeed that shareholders’ self-interest with respect to debates about optimal 
corporate governance has changed with the decoupling (via derivatives) of an 
economic interest from the legal rights traditionally embedded in the 
shareholding relationship. In other words, the economic interests of 
shareholders are not static but are themselves reconstituted in the 
process of negotiating corporate governance norms (Hutter, this issue; 
Condon 1998). Ford and Hess find a general lack of enthusiasm among 
the businesses researched to embrace the fundamental organizational 
changes proposed by monitorships—thereby reinforcing their conviction 
that meaningful enforcement matters—though, since these initiatives follow 
on the heels of regulatory enforcement processes, their organizational 
subjects are unlikely to be “compliance leaders” anyway (Thornton, 
Gunningham, and Kagan 2005). This lack of enthusiasm may also in part 
speak to the question of “capacity” noted by Hutter as a key predictor of 
the likely success of new governance initiatives. 
  
V. NEW GOVERNANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
Some scholars of new governance are quick to point out that the horizontal 
and experimental approach they advocate will not be successful in the 
absence of a rigorous enforcement regime (Ford 2005; Karkkainen 2004). 
For example, Hutter insists that states are required to assess whether or not 
to take drastic action against businesses that are “persistently incapable” of 
managing risk. Some of the articles in this issue take on the question of what 
a new governance-inspired enforcement program for regulation might look 
like. As we have noted above, Ford and Hess’s article on corporate 
monitorships is an example of the kind of cultural experimentation that 
new governance advocates in the enforcement sphere. Interestingly, 
Conley and Williams’ article raises the issue of whether the Equator 
Principles analysed therein could work as a substitute for the lack of 
enforcement of environmental norms by particular jurisdictions. New 
governance engages with the broader socio-legal debate about enforcement 
effectiveness by pointing to the need for creativity and remaining sensitive 
to context, while acknowledging enforcement’s continued importance in 
the regulatory toolkit. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A final question for an introduction that seeks to synthesize the findings of a 
diverse set of articles is whether there are generalizable insights to be derived 
therein. In our view, the “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973, 6) of specific 
  
organizational contexts that these articles provide are precisely the point. 
Generalizable conclusions—in the sense of “off the rack” theoretical 
recommendations that can be applied with minimal regard to context and 
situation—do not present themselves here. This should not be a surprise at 
this stage. Rather, these case studies and others like them are the context-rich 
material required to develop a set of relevant questions that those involved in 
new governance efforts could be considering. Taken together, these articles 
reinforce a conviction that we alluded to at the beginning of this 
introduction: that granular stories about actual new governance efforts 
shed crucial light on how programs are implemented within business 
organizations. 
We might even imagine a provisional matrix of sorts going forward, which 
tries to draw out learning from these and other accounts. Among other 
elements it would consider extant context—the nature of the industry in 
question (Hutter) or of an enforceable background rule of law norm (Conley 
and Williams). It would demand conscious attention to the location of 
agency, the precise nature of different actors’ capacities, and power. 
Particular forms of expertise will be salient in particular contexts. Our 
provisional matrix would therefore call for an intimate understanding of 
the relevant actors—of why internal actors can be effective change agents 
in the Federal Trade Commisison (FTC) privacy context, for example 
(Bamberger and Mulligan); of why ex-prosecutors do not function 
perfectly as corporate monitors (Ford and Hess); and of the conditions 
under which a broader group of stakeholders is accorded a voice in high-
stakes decisions, such as the Algoma Steel restructuring (Sarra). Equally 
  
important would be a clear-eyed appraisal of what particular factors, 
beyond the sphere of short-term self-interest, are expected to stimulate 
change in a particular situation. Given the apparently recurring problems 
incorporating broad, direct stakeholder participation, new governance 
scholars and practitioners also have to ask themselves how important 
broad participation is to the approach (likely very important) and 
whether and how the problem can be remediated in any particular 
situation. The question is directly posed through these case studies and 
demands a response. 
Making new governance successes replicable across business organizations 
requires not generality, but specificity, experimentalism, and pragmatism. 
This is the kind of work called for in order to continue to deepen our 
understanding of why new governance methods work when they do, what 
their essential preconditions are, what considerations should be explicit in 
formulating a new governance effort, and what some of the most perilous 
steps may be in the translation from theory to practice. 
 
NOTE 
1. The origin of this special issue on new governance and the business organization 
lies in a symposium held at The University of British Columbia in Vancouver, 
Canada in May 2009, sponsored by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council, the Law Foundation of British Columbia, and the National 
Centre for Business Law at the University of British Columbia. The symposium 
brought together an exciting and eclectic group of scholars from Canada, the 
United States, England, and Australia, who collectively represented disciplines 
such as law, business, information studies, sociology, and political science. 
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